𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙙𝙚𝙗𝙖𝙩𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙬𝙝𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙗𝙧𝙞𝙙𝙜𝙚 𝙬𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙡𝙚𝙜𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙮 𝙧𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙩 𝙩𝙤 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙎𝙩𝙖𝙩𝙚 𝙖𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 “𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙛𝙧𝙚𝙚.” 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙙𝙚𝙗𝙖𝙩𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙩 𝙬𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙘𝙤𝙨𝙩 𝙩𝙖𝙭𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙚𝙧𝙨 𝙗𝙚𝙩𝙬𝙚𝙚𝙣 𝙣𝙤𝙬 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙣 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝙖 𝙩𝙤𝙡𝙡-𝙛𝙧𝙚𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙢𝙚.
Without the benefit of the most recent financial statements (2024 or 2025), let us examine the 2020 financial statements, which are publicly available, for the purposes of demonstration — to determine whether the Government made a sound financial decision.
What are the variables?
The first and most important variable is that the bridge toll was eliminated in 2025 as a matter of Government policy. Once tolls were removed, Government would necessarily have to provide subsidy equivalent to the revenue that was previously collected from those tolls.
Now, using the 2020 figures — which were not even reflective of peak revenue performance, given COVID and the preceding period of economic stress — let us assume for demonstration that tolls were eliminated in 2020 and that the concession agreement expires in 2027/2028, approximately seven years later.
Under that scenario, Government would have had to provide cumulative subvention of approximately $9.45 billion over that period.
Meanwhile, the total debt on the books as of 2020 was less than $5 billion.
That comparison alone answers the question.
It therefore makes economic and financial sense to activate takeover of control of the bridge company — retire the debt obligations to bondholders and lenders, settle the preference shares, and negotiate a terminal payment with common shareholders, whose residual value is materially weakened by an accumulated deficit of approximately $1.65 billion on the books.
In this illustration, the notional saving relative to continued subsidy exposure is approximately $4.45 billion.
Importantly, Government is not purchasing “value” in the sense critics imply; Government is purchasing control of the concession structure and retiring the debt burden in order to eliminate future subsidy exposure.
That represents consolidation of control of strategic infrastructure, elimination of recurring fiscal exposure, and alignment with a policy that benefits at least 200,000 citizens who rely on the crossing.
As for the new bridge, that discussion should be grounded in net economic benefit analysis — both retrospectively over the last 20 years and prospectively within the context of Guyana’s structural transformation. The Deepwater Port, the Guyana-Brazil corridor, and the Lethem road network will significantly alter the volume and value of commerce passing through Guyana. Infrastructure decisions must be evaluated within that growth trajectory, not in isolation.
For context, the Berbice Bridge was originally constructed under a Public-Private Partnership model with a heavily leveraged capital structure — approximately 84% debt and 16% equity. That financial architecture has always carried structural vulnerability. Once tolls were removed, the economics of the concession fundamentally changed.
The debate, therefore, is not about whether the bridge would legally revert to the State at the end of the concession “for free”. The debate is what it would cost taxpayers between now and then under a toll-free regime.
The arithmetic is straightforward.