THIS week, I had planned to write about how I visualise the election results after September 1, 2025. Then I ran into Ralph Ramkarran’s Conversation Tree, released yesterday on social media, and in his weekly column in the Stabroek News. I sighed at the thought that he beat me to the punch. Consequently, my piece today has turned into a response, of sorts, to Ralph’s predictions.
Ralph’s predictions are essentially an evaluation of past results, which formed a definite trend he thinks will hold in 2025. He does not see shifts or changes in political behaviour sufficiently pronounced to result in major deviations from historical voting trends.
Ralph didn’t expressly say it, but one can easily read into it that he believes the PPP/C will come away with a majority similar to 2020, while APNU will suffer some losses due to “dissatisfaction with leadership”.
He does not foresee any major shift in the results pattern. He intoned that “something more substantial must be evident before it can be concluded that there is a substantial ethnic swing towards the PPP”.
In his analysis, Ramkarran completely ignores the suggestive value of the results of the Local Government Elections (LGE) since 2016. Perhaps he believes there isn’t sufficient indicative value in them, but I disagree. These elections are pivotal in understanding shifting trends in openness and reception of political messages from the, quote-unquote, “other side,” along with morphing voting attitudes.
Let’s start with candidate lists in the 2016 LGE. Despite being in government, with a leader who had developed a rock star-type image and a prime minister who was supposedly popular among East Indians, APNU+AFC was only able to field candidates in just a few local authority areas traditionally administered by the PPP/C.
The same could be said for the PPP. The party contested in almost none of the African enclaves. VP Bharrat Jagdeo, at his weekly press conferences, admitted more than once that it wasn’t that the PPP was unwilling to contest—they could not find candidates.
From my own inside knowledge of the coalition’s mobilisation efforts, the story was pretty much the same. There was a tight, almost impenetrable racial political bubble that existed, created and calcified through our historical ethnic adherence and cling patterns to the two major parties.
The 2018 LGE was not much different. APNU and AFC contested the elections separately. APNU couldn’t field lists in any of the PPP/C strongholds. AFC had representation in a minor number of East Indian enclaves but fielded candidates mainly in APNU strongholds.
Indo-Guyanese almost totally ignored the AFC in the 2018 election. It was a signal that Indo-Guyanese were punishing the AFC for teaming up with APNU. There was also a signal from traditional Afro constituencies that APNU does not have exclusivity in those enclaves.
Then came the 2023 LGE, where the PPP/C was able to field candidates, for the first time, in almost all constituencies nationally, while APNU was unable to even cover all of its own strongholds. The thing about LGEs is that they have a feature that allows us to evaluate micro-constituencies even within larger enclaves.
AFC sat out that election, citing problems with the list. I have said in this column that their absence had nothing to do with the list; it was a cop-out. They didn’t contest because they were unable to cope with the rapid membership attrition. AFC had chosen for itself frontline soldiers who were not party builders, whose MO was to ride on general party popularity and who do not know how or care to build and sustain small party groups, which is immensely useful in LGEs.
The returns of the 2023 LGE showed that the PPP/C moved from being unable to find candidates for Afro-dominated LGE constituencies to being able to cover over 90 per cent of traditional APNU constituencies. This trend is a potent signal for expectations about electoral outcomes.
This, coupled with the fact that in some of these communities the PPP was, in the past, unable to peacefully hold public meetings or post party colours, represents a significant change in electoral behaviour, even if it did not result in a full shift in voting patterns.
But there were some noticeable shifts. Linden, Mocha, Georgetown, and New Amsterdam are some local authorities where the PPP increased its seat count, which could only have been realised by shifts in Afro voting patterns. These are the most recent poll results we have.
Total attendance at public meetings and election rallies is not necessarily a proxy for vote count. It is simply a reflection of logistical and mobilisation capacity or effort. However, when it comes to significant cross-racial attendance, it is useful for developing expectations about electoral results.
The Afro presence in the PPP campaign apparatus is unmistakable. For the first time, we have seen so many Afro-Guyanese openly don PPP colours, attend meetings and rallies, defend the party on social media, and form part of PPP’s house-to-house campaign delegation. So, while the actual numbers at rallies may be misleading if used in place of polls, we cannot say the same about cross-racial attendance.
Then there is also the unprecedented attrition, compounded by accusations of weak leadership in APNU. While we cannot ignore the smaller parties, Mohamed, Hughes, Walton, and Broomes, they will not significantly impact the results. And if they do, it will be to the detriment of APNU.
Formerly closed Afro-dominated communities are now receptive to PPP entreaty. There is waning African aggression and an increased ability of the PPP to peacefully engage African households and post party colours in significant Afro communities.
Africans are openly wearing party colours, campaigning aggressively for the PPP, and actually attending meetings and rallies. In the background, we have the results of the 2023 LGE, which show indubitably that Afro-Guyanese have voted for the PPP in numbers higher than usual.
Unlike Ramkarran, I will not shy away from specifying. I believe the PPP will attract a positive 7 per cent over and above its 2020 returns.