SPHEREX INSIGHTS | GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY NOTE

Guyana at the Centre

Deepening US Ties While Preserving Strategic Relations with China and Managing Domestic Political Risk

SphereX Professional Services Inc. | 1 September 2026

Author: Joel Bhagwandin

FIRST-YEAR POST-ELECTION STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

KEY MESSAGE: *One year after the 2025 election, Guyana sits at the intersection of major-power competition, a transformed domestic opposition, a persistent territorial claim and rapidly expanding offshore wealth. It should deepen its indispensable and increasingly strategic relationship with the United States, which is firmly in Guyana's national interest, without weakening, destroying or turning hostile its long-standing relationships with China, India and other partners. The task is not anti-China positioning; it is disciplined pro-Guyana statecraft anchored in external partnership, domestic legitimacy and credible national deterrence.*

Key insights

- **Deepening US ties, not transactional alignment.** Guyana's security and economic realities justify an increasingly deep strategic relationship with the United States, which should be supported unequivocally, while preserving sovereign room to work constructively with China, India and other longstanding partners.
- **Balanced external relations are a strategic asset.** The paper does not frame China as an adversary to be displaced. It argues for transparent, standards-based engagement in which Chinese, American, Indian and other projects are judged by procurement integrity, engineering quality, financing terms, security exposure and national development value.
- **The CJIA dispute illustrates why project history matters.** The airport's redesign, subsequent additions and extraordinary passenger growth must be separated from contractor performance. Chinese, American and other projects should be assessed through the same procurement, engineering, financing and delivery standards.
- **The hemisphere is being reordered.** The re-invocation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States, the transition in Venezuela, expanding regional energy integration and major-power competition place Guyana closer to the center of hemispheric strategy.
- **The Venezuela risk has been re-rated, not eliminated.** Near-term escalation risk has declined from moderate–high to low–moderate, considering that the territorial claim survives political change and may remain a long-duration sovereign-security exposure even after an ICJ ruling.
- **Petroleum scale changes the defence equation.** Production of about 900,000 barrels per day and expected capacity of roughly 1.7mn barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2030 require proportionate investment in surveillance, readiness, mobility, sustainment, cyber resilience and credible deterrence.
- **The 2025 election changed the domestic equation.** A sanctions-exposed private actor became the constitutionally elected Leader of the Opposition. The Government cannot manage the post-election reality as though the pre-election circumstances still obtain.
- **Legal accountability and political restraint must coexist.** The extradition process should proceed independently, but excessive state harassment and personalized official attacks risk creating an appearance of political persecution. Government should answer false claims with facts and engage on public-policy terrain.
- **The doctrine should remain pro-Guyanese.** Guyana should combine deeper US partnership without dependency, constructive China relations without strategic naivety, constitutional competition without institutional degradation, and diplomacy backed by national capability and sovereign decision-making.

1. The CJIA exchange is a signal, not an isolated quarrel

The public exchange between the Chinese Embassy and a United States official over Chinese-backed projects is more than a dispute about one airport. It is an early manifestation of the pressure Guyana will face as its oil wealth, Atlantic location, mineral resources and territorial-security concerns attract major-power attention. The Embassy cited the Cheddi Jagan International Airport (CJIA), the new Demerara River Bridge, the China–Guyana Friendship Joe Vieira Park and regional hospitals. The United States, meanwhile, is pressing concerns about Chinese influence and control of strategically important infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.

Guyana should resist a false binary. A deeper relationship with Washington is strategically necessary in security, energy, trade, technology, finance and defence of territorial integrity—and should be embraced as a central pillar of national strategy. But deepening US ties does not require hostility towards China or the dismantling of decades of development cooperation. The governing standard should be transparent performance, national interest and sovereign choice—not the nationality of the investor or contractor.

2. The CJIA dispute requires the full project history

The original 2011 contract, concluded under the PPP/C administration, contemplated a substantially new airport: a new terminal, expanded apron and eight passenger-boarding bridges, financed through a US$138mn Chinese credit facility and approximately US$12mn in Guyanese counterpart resources. After the APNU+AFC administration took office in 2015, the scope was redesigned from a new-build concept into a rehabilitation and expansion programme centered on the existing terminal, a smaller arrivals facility and fewer boarding bridges.

When the PPP/C returned to office in 2020, it inherited that modified configuration. Additional works were subsequently negotiated. This history does not automatically absolve the contractor of every performance question. It does mean the final outcome cannot reasonably be attributed to the contractor alone. A fair assessment must separate government-approved scope changes, contract administration and evolving operational requirements from contractor execution.

Those requirements changed dramatically. Government aviation data show CJIA passenger movements rising from 182,736 in 2020 to 973,016 in 2025—more than 430 percent—while landings increased from 1,646 to 5,827 and available seats expanded from roughly 342,000 to 1.71mn. Nine new international airlines reportedly entered the market between 2020 and early 2026. British Airways opened direct connectivity to the United Kingdom, while the UK's removal of the visitor-visa requirement for Guyanese citizens further supported travel. Continued expansion was therefore also a response to an economy and aviation market changing faster than earlier forecasts anticipated.

3. Nationality is not a substitute for project assessment

The same discipline applies when projects involve US firms. The Gas-to-Energy project includes US-based contractor Lindsayca, yet its schedule moved beyond the original target. Public projections now point to staged delivery: initial generation by end-2026, the principal 228-megawatt plant in the first quarter of 2027, and the full 300-megawatt configuration later in 2027. That does not prove American contractors are unreliable. It shows that large projects can experience design, procurement, interface, logistics and implementation problems regardless of nationality.

Every major project should face the same matrix: procurement integrity, financing cost, local-content contribution, delivery time, engineering quality, lifecycle cost, environmental and social safeguards, security exposure and consistency with Guyana's development strategy. The Stabroek Block itself illustrates coexistence: US-linked partners operate alongside CNOOC, which holds 25 percent. Guyana's most consequential commercial project already combines American and Chinese capital.

4. Rivalry and interdependence define the US–China relationship

Washington and Beijing are strategic competitors, but they are not economically separate. At June 2026, mainland China held approximately US$633.4bn in US Treasury securities. US–China goods trade totalled about US$414.6bn in 2025.

Chinese majority-owned affiliates in the United States generated roughly US$107.8bn in sales, US$18.5bn in value added and 118,000 jobs in 2023, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Competition is nevertheless intensifying across semiconductors, telecommunications, critical minerals, ports, data infrastructure, defence and supply chains. The United States' 2025 National Security Strategy describes a renewed Western Hemisphere priority through a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine and seeks to prevent non-hemispheric competitors from controlling strategic regional assets. Guyana must take that direction seriously. It should also observe that major powers compete while continuing to trade, invest and hold one another's assets. Strategic management is not indiscriminate decoupling.

5. The Western Hemisphere has been reordered

The regional context changed sharply in 2026. On 3 January, US forces conducted strikes in Venezuela in support of an operation that apprehended Nicolás Maduro and transferred him to the United States for prosecution. Delcy Rodríguez subsequently assumed interim authority. By 31 August, the White House announced an oil arrangement involving 100-year concessions over 17 fields with approximately 65bn barrels of proven reserves, a 35 percent US government equity interest in the operator's parent, guaranteed low-cost off-take and a plan for up to US$100bn in infrastructure investment. The arrangement is contested and its commercial and legal execution remains uncertain, but its strategic direction is unmistakable: Washington is reorganizing energy, ownership and influence in the hemisphere.

Trinidad and Tobago is also being repositioned within this energy architecture. In August 2026, its government announced Venezuelan licenses relating to Loran Phase 2 and Plataforma Deltana, with bpTT, XRG and regional partners positioned to monetize more than 12 trillion cubic feet of potential gas through Trinidad's infrastructure. Guyana, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago are therefore becoming components of a wider hemispheric energy system shaped increasingly by US strategic preferences and US-linked capital.

Beyond the hemisphere, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on 28 February 2026, and Iranian authorities confirmed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening US–Israeli attacks. This does not create a direct legal inference for any Guyanese case. It does demonstrate the present administration's willingness to use hard power against actors it identifies as security threats, reinforcing the need for small states to distinguish carefully between diplomatic flexibility and misreading US strategic resolve.

6. Venezuela has been stabilized, but the territorial risk has not disappeared

The US-led removal of Nicolás Maduro, the installation of an interim authority and the subsequent energy compact have materially changed the near-term risk environment. Washington now possesses far greater leverage over Caracas, while Venezuela has strong incentives to prioritize political consolidation, oil-sector rehabilitation and access to capital. That supports a lower assessment of immediate escalation risk. It does not support the conclusion that the border controversy will die a natural death.

The evidence since the transition is unambiguous. In May 2026, acting President Delcy Rodríguez appeared during the final oral hearings at the International Court of Justice and stated that Venezuela would not renounce what it describes as its historical rights over the Guayana Esequiba.

Her government continued to reject the Court as the sole route to settlement and maintained the Geneva Agreement as its preferred framework. CARICOM separately reaffirmed that the controversy remains before the Court and warned against the use of regional platforms to legitimize Venezuela's claim.

An eventual ICJ judgment would be legally decisive for the case before it, but adjudication is not the same as automatic political closure. A court can determine legal validity; it cannot by itself erase nationalist doctrine, guarantee domestic acceptance in Venezuela or remove the need for surveillance and deterrence. The correct strategic conclusion is therefore a re-rating—not a deletion—of sovereign-security risk.

Risk dimension	Earlier profile	1 Sep 2026 assessment	Interpretation
Near-term military escalation	Moderate–high	Low–moderate	US leverage over Caracas and the present political transition reduce immediate escalation incentives, but do not remove capability, miscalculation or domestic-nationalist risk.
Long-horizon territorial claim	High	High	The successor Venezuelan authority has expressly maintained the claim and continues to reject adjudication as the sole settlement route.
Legal resolution	Pending	Advanced, not self-executing	The ICJ merits process has reached final oral hearings. A binding judgment would clarify the legal position, but implementation and political acceptance remain separate questions.
Offshore energy exposure	High and rising	Very high and rising	Current production has reached about 900,000 b/d and eight developments are expected to provide approximately 1.7mn boe/d of capacity by 2030.

SphereX qualitative risk assessment as at 1 September 2026. *The rating is a structured policy judgment, not a probability forecast.*

> **RISK JUDGMENT:** *SphereX re-rates near-term escalation risk from moderate–high in the late-Maduro environment to low–moderate under the present US-shaped transition. The long-duration territorial risk remains high because the claim survives regime change. This is a reduction in immediacy, not an elimination of the underlying exposure.*

7. Petroleum scale requires a national deterrence and resilience programme

Guyana's security posture must now reflect the value, geographic spread and systemic importance of the assets it is expected to protect. Stabroek production reached approximately 900,000 barrels per day in November 2025. ExxonMobil expects eight developments to provide about 1.7mn barrels of oil equivalent per day of production capacity by 2030. The offshore economy will therefore become both more valuable and more exposed—to territorial coercion, sabotage, cyber disruption, maritime incidents and infrastructure failure.

The revenue trajectory also strengthens Guyana's capacity to finance security. SphereX's 2025 Stabroek assessment records approximately 32mn Government barrels from 260mn barrels lifted, or 12.3 percent, broadly consistent with a heavily utilized 75 percent cost-oil ceiling. As older recoverable costs decline, the residual profit-oil pool can expand: for example, a 50 percent cost-oil share would yield Government profit oil equal to 25 percent of gross production before royalty, while a 40 percent cost-oil share would yield 30 percent. The approximately 30 percent figure should therefore be treated as a forward scenario dependent on cost recovery, new investment, prices, audit outcomes and lift timing—not as Guyana's verified 2025 share.

This fiscal expansion should support a disciplined, multi-year force-development programme—not ad hoc weapons acquisition or prestige procurement. The priority is usable capability, trained personnel and lifecycle sustainment. Guyana should commission a national defence and critical-infrastructure review; define the missions the state must perform; and then fund the force structure, logistics and partnerships required to perform them.

- **Build maritime and air-domain awareness.** Integrate coastal radar, satellite services, patrol aircraft, uncrewed systems, vessel tracking and an intelligence fusion capability able to monitor offshore platforms, approaches and the border environment.
- **Improve mobility, presence and response.** Expand appropriate coast-guard and airlift capacity, riverine mobility, forward operating support and rapid reinforcement for remote communities and critical installations.
- **Invest in readiness and sustainment.** Create multi-year stocks of fuel, spare parts, medical supplies, secure communications and authorized munitions calibrated to defence plans; fund maintenance, training and availability rather than acquisition alone.

- **Protect the national balance sheet.** Strengthen cyber defence, energy and telecommunications redundancy, port and airport security, continuity-of-government systems and emergency restoration capacity.
- **Deepen interoperability without surrendering autonomy.** Expand training, exercises, intelligence exchange and lawful security cooperation with the United States, CARICOM, Brazil and other trusted partners while retaining Guyanese command and sovereign control.
- **Apply procurement discipline.** Use threat-based requirements, competitive lifecycle costing, parliamentary oversight, inventory controls and independent technical evaluation so that defence spending produces credible deterrence rather than a new channel for concentrated procurement.

The strategic principle is straightforward: diplomacy, international law and alliance support remain Guyana's first line of protection, but they are strengthened—not weakened—when backed by national awareness, resilience and a credible capacity to impose costs on coercion. Oil wealth should finance that capacity prudently before the risk environment deteriorates again.

8. The 2025 election converted a sanctions issue into a constitutional issue

The pre-election and post-election situations are materially different. When OFAC imposed sanctions in June 2024, Azruddin Mohamed was a private businessman and had not yet entered electoral politics. In that setting, a firm Government posture towards a freshly sanctioned actor was understandable and, in the author's view, broadly appropriate. WIN was launched in June 2025. Three months later, the party won 16 seats, displaced APNU as the principal opposition force and contributed to the most significant disruption of Guyana's party structure in decades. The PPP/C increased its parliamentary representation from 33 to 36 seats; APNU fell to 12; and FGM secured one. Mohamed was elected Leader of the Opposition in January 2026 with the support of WIN's members and the FGM representative.

That electoral result did not remove the sanctions or determine the criminal allegations. It did, however, create a constitutional reality that cannot be managed as though the pre-election status quo still exists. As at 1 September 2026—exactly one year after the election—the Leader of the Opposition remains in Guyana, continues to hold office and has not been extradited. The legal process is active, but its timing and ultimate result are not within the Government's political control.

There have also been claims in Guyana's political discourse that, before his formal entry into politics, Mohamed met US authorities in Barbados and explored a negotiated resolution that did not conclude. SphereX has not located an official US statement, court filing or other primary record confirming that account. It is therefore included only as a reported claim, not as an established fact. What is established is that he later retained US legal and advocacy representation and that the extradition process remains contested.

Sanctions, elections and extradition: the institutional sequence

Date	Institutional development
11 Jun 2024	OFAC designates Nazar Mohamed, Azruddin Mohamed, Mohamed's Enterprise and related parties under Global Magnitsky authorities for alleged corruption.
Jun 2025	WIN is launched, converting a sanctions-exposed business controversy into a national political challenge.
1 Sep 2025	General election: PPP/C wins 36 seats; WIN 16; APNU 12; FGM 1. The traditional opposition order is displaced.
2 Oct 2025	A US federal grand jury returns an indictment alleging fraud, money laundering and tax- and royalty-evasion schemes.
28–31 Oct 2025	The United States requests extradition; the Authority to Proceed is issued; Nazar and Azruddin Mohamed are arrested and released on bail.
26 Jan 2026	Azruddin Mohamed is elected Leader of the Opposition with support from WIN's 16 MPs and the FGM member.
29 Jul 2026	The Caribbean Court of Justice dismisses an appeal that had paused the extradition proceedings.

Date	Institutional development (continued)
28 Aug 2026	The Court of Appeal allows the Magistrates' Court inquiry to continue but stays any final disposition pending an expedited constitutional appeal set for 13 October 2026.

Source: *GECOM statement; US Treasury and Justice Department releases; CCJ judgment and Court of Appeal reporting. Charges remain allegations unless proven in court.*

9. The investigation, the sanctions and the unresolved allegations

The investigation that culminated in the June 2024 sanctions did not begin in 2024. Public reporting, including statements attributed to a former Natural Resources Minister, indicates that US law-enforcement interest in the Mohameds and Guyana's gold trade dated to around 2016–2017. The Florida indictment alleges conduct from 2017 through June 2024. The sanctions must therefore be situated within a multi-year—now almost decade-long—investigative continuum, followed by the 2025 indictment and extradition request.

The OFAC communication alleged under-declaration of Guyanese gold exports, evasion of more than US$50mn in taxes, bribery and corruption. It did not expressly identify the gold as Venezuelan and did not expressly allege terrorist financing. The author's contention, however, is that the absence of those matters from the sanctions communication should not be treated as conclusive proof that they were never within the wider investigative background. In Guyana, Venezuelan-origin gold smuggling and suspected terrorist-financing links have been advanced as possible underlying concerns. These remain serious but unproven allegations—not findings of this note—and the public record reviewed does not establish them.

Complete disclosure of the evidence accompanying the US extradition request was reported in November 2025, while the public Florida record identifies an 11-count indictment in case 25-cr-20441. The full evidentiary case has not yet been tested at trial. The author's expectation is that any wider underlying allegation, if supported, would have to emerge through admissible evidence in Florida or through lawfully disclosed extradition material. Until then, it cannot responsibly be stated as an established fact. The accused deny wrongdoing, the indictment remains an allegation, and the presumption of innocence continues to apply.

10. The legal strategy has changed the political time horizon

The United States formally requested extradition on 28 October 2025. The proceedings began, were interrupted by successive constitutional and procedural challenges, and resumed after the Caribbean Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on 29 July 2026. On 28 August, the Court of Appeal declined to stop the Magistrates' Court inquiry but prevented a final disposition until an expedited constitutional appeal is determined. That appeal is scheduled for 13 October 2026.

The legal team has therefore not defeated the extradition request, but it has used available judicial mechanisms to extend and reshape the timetable. That distinction is important. Government should respect the independence of the courts and avoid presenting litigation as proof of guilt, innocence or political conspiracy. It should also avoid constructing its political strategy around the expectation of imminent extradition. Until a final lawful outcome, the Opposition Leader remains a domestic political actor with an electoral mandate.

11. Washington is now also an arena of Guyana's domestic contest

The opposition's response is not confined to the courts. Public reporting on a US Foreign Agents Registration Act filing states that WIN retained Wyoming-based LSG LLC to develop relationships with the US Government and private sector, with a US$250,000 advance payment disclosed. The filing's stated purpose is relationship cultivation and information distribution. It does not, by itself, prove an effort to interfere with the extradition case or establish access to the White House.

The Government of Guyana also uses Washington advocacy firms. During consideration of the 2026 Budget Estimates, the Foreign Affairs Minister confirmed payments of US$40,000 per month to DR Consultancy and US$50,000 per month to Continental Strategy. Separate FARA materials show Continental distributing information on Guyana's behalf concerning the country's alignment with US and broader Western interests.

The observable fact is therefore more significant than any unsupported inference: both the state and its principal opposition recognize that influence, reputation and access in Washington matter. Guyana's domestic political contest has acquired an external advocacy layer at the same moment the country is becoming more strategically important to the United States. That heightens the value of disciplined official communication and reduces the margin for rhetoric that cannot survive international scrutiny.

12. The Government should recalibrate and end the appearance of political persecution

Recalibration does not mean minimizing the sanctions, interfering with extradition or treating serious allegations casually. The case for recalibration begins with changed status. Before the election, the Government was dealing with a newly sanctioned private actor. Today it is dealing simultaneously with the subject of extradition proceedings and the constitutionally elected Leader of the Opposition. The law must still be enforced; constitutional office cannot confer immunity. But enforcement must now be demonstrably lawful, proportionate and insulated from partisan direction.

The recent pattern has become troubling. In the July 2026 judgment, three CCJ judges stated that public comments by government officials concerning the pending proceedings could undermine judicial independence and were "to be denounced"; another opinion recorded the hostile comments made by senior Government officials while also noting the Opposition Leader's participation in the political exchange. In late August 2026, a disputed maritime enforcement operation led to Mohamed's arrest and release on bail. Authorities alleged unlicensed operation and failure to stop; opposition representatives disputed that account and alleged harassment. These contested events do not establish political persecution, but they create a serious appearance problem for the state.

In the author's assessment, the cumulative effect now resembles excessive state harassment and risks being understood, domestically and internationally, as political persecution. The Government should stop that trajectory. It should enforce the law neutrally, avoid gratuitous public attacks, answer false allegations with facts, engage the constitutional office where required and meet the Opposition Leader on the Government's strongest ground: public policy, evidence, implementation and delivery. This is not capitulation. It is strategic discipline.

- **Require proportionality and an auditable legal basis.** Enforcement involving the Opposition Leader should apply the same standards used for any citizen, be supported by clear statutory authority and be documented in a manner capable of independent scrutiny.
- **Separate the legal and political tracks.** Allow courts and treaty procedures to operate without making extradition the centerpiece of domestic political strategy.
- **Answer false or misleading claims with evidence.** Publish project milestones, procurement records, fiscal data, service outcomes and implementation dashboards rather than relying primarily on personalized rhetoric.
- **Engage the constitutional office, subject to law.** Where national security, the Essequibo controversy, parliamentary consultation or major institutional reforms require dialogue, engagement should occur with appropriate sanctions-risk and legal safeguards.
- **Do not underestimate political adaptability.** The formation of a party, acquisition of 16 seats, successful election as Opposition Leader, sustained litigation and investment in US advocacy demonstrate organizational capacity even where the ultimate legal position remains uncertain.
- **Avoid manufacturing martyrdom.** Over-personalization can allow a political opponent to substitute grievance for policy. Evidence-led contest forces the debate back to competence, credibility and delivery.
- **Protect institutional credibility.** Government statements should use the exact language of sanctions notices, indictments and judgments, clearly distinguishing allegation, charge, designation and conviction.

13. A diversified partnership strategy is now even more important

Domestic political resilience strengthens foreign-policy autonomy. A country divided by personalized confrontation becomes more vulnerable to external influence, competing lobbying narratives and transactional pressure.

Conversely, a state that can manage opposition constitutionally, publish evidence and sustain national consensus on core interests is better positioned to maintain several external relationships without being captured by any one of them.

Guyana established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1972. China engaged Guyana through periods of limited fiscal space and severe infrastructure deficits, often offering relatively low-cost capital and rapid mobilization. India's relationship is equally longstanding: diplomatic representation dates to 1965, and the partnership now spans energy, agriculture, health, pharmaceuticals, technology, defence, education and infrastructure. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 2024 visit produced ten bilateral agreements, while Indian concessional financing has supported roads, ferries, health facilities, solar systems and aircraft.

These relationships should not be treated as sentimental entitlements or exemptions from scrutiny. They are strategic assets to be managed. Guyana can reserve sensitive domains—defence, selected telecommunications systems, critical digital infrastructure and other assets with direct security implications—for partners and standards consistent with its security architecture.

It can simultaneously welcome Chinese, Indian, European, Canadian, Brazilian, CARICOM and other participation in transparently procured sectors where projects meet national standards and do not create unacceptable dependence.

14. A pro-Guyanese doctrine for external, internal and security strategy

The central thesis can now be stated more fully. Guyana should pursue partnership without dependency externally and constitutional competition without institutional degradation internally. That requires:

- A national strategic-investment framework identifying open sectors, sensitive sectors and nationality-neutral review criteria.
- Competitive procurement and disclosure of material financing obligations, contract variations, delivery milestones and lifecycle costs.
- A diversified portfolio of finance, technology, construction capacity, trade, security and critical-infrastructure partners.
- A cross-party floor of national consensus on territorial integrity, critical infrastructure, sanctions compliance and the protection of Guyana's sovereign decision-making.
- A funded national defence and resilience plan linking offshore-asset growth to domain awareness, readiness, sustainment, cyber protection and civil-defence capacity.
- Transparent disclosure and parliamentary oversight of foreign lobbying and advocacy expenditure by the state, alongside full compliance with applicable disclosure laws by political parties.
- Stronger domestic negotiating, engineering, legal, procurement, project-management and strategic-communications capacity.
- A public-policy culture in which allegations are tested against records, institutions speak precisely, and political disagreement does not become diplomatic vulnerability.

There are enough opportunities in Guyana's development programme for the United States, China, India, the European Union, Canada, Brazil, CARICOM partners and others to participate without every investment becoming a proxy battle. The Government can legitimately give preference to US participation where the bilateral security interest is strongest, while preserving commercially sound cooperation with other partners elsewhere. What it must not do is allow any external power—friend or competitor—to define Guyana's entire development-partner portfolio.

Conclusion: the first anniversary is a strategic checkpoint

The first anniversary of the 2025 election is more than a political milestone. It is a strategic checkpoint. In one year, Guyana's domestic opposition structure changed, Washington became more deeply embedded in the country's security and political environment, Venezuela entered a US-shaped transition without abandoning the Essequibo claim, and the value of Guyana's offshore economy continued to rise. These are not separate developments. Together, they define the environment in which the state must now govern.

Guyana can deepen its indispensable relationship with the United States without dismantling its historic relationships with China, India and other partners. It can also uphold its extradition obligations without turning a sanctioned and indicted political opponent into a martyr. The Government's strongest response is not continuous personal confrontation or the excessive use of state power. It is institutional confidence: independent legal process, proportional enforcement, constitutional engagement where required, facts over invective, superior policy performance and visible delivery.

> The same discipline applies to the territorial question. US leverage over Caracas has lowered the immediate risk, but it has not erased Venezuela's claim. Diplomacy, the ICJ process and international partnerships remain essential, but they should be backed by sustained investment in Guyana's own defence, surveillance, readiness and national resilience as the offshore asset base expands.

The strategic doctrine that emerges is therefore unapologetically pro-Guyanese: partnership without dependency; accountability without presumption; constitutional competition without persecution; diplomacy backed by deterrence; and cooperation without surrendering the sovereign right to decide what best advances Guyana's security and development. That is the balance required for the next phase of the republic—not only for the Government of the day, but for the state Guyana is becoming.

Selected sources

• Chinese Embassy in Guyana, statement on China–Guyana cooperation (31 August 2026)
• News Room Guyana, CJIA project scope and US official's criticism (29 August 2026)
• Department of Public Information, Guyana aviation growth, 2020–2025
• News Room Guyana, expansion in international airlines since 2020 (17 February 2026)
• Guyana Times, revised Gas-to-Energy delivery schedule
• ExxonMobil Guyana, Stabroek Block participant interests
• US Treasury, major foreign holders of Treasury securities (June 2026)
• US Census Bureau, trade in goods with China
• US Bureau of Economic Analysis, activities of US affiliates of foreign multinationals (2023)
• The White House, National Security Strategy (2025)
• GECOM statement on the declaration of the 2025 election results
• US Treasury, OFAC designation: "Treasury Targets Corruption Network in Guyana" (11 June 2024)
• US Department of Justice, Mohamed indictment summary (28 November 2025)
• Caribbean Court of Justice, Mohamed extradition judgment (29 July 2026)
• News Room Guyana, extradition proceedings and Court of Appeal order (28 August 2026)
• Guyana Times, WIN's US FARA-registered advocacy engagement (28 February 2026)
• Kaieteur News, Government disclosure of US advocacy-firm expenditure (12 February 2026)
• US FARA filing, Continental Strategy material distributed for the Government of Guyana (28 May 2026)
• White House, US–Venezuela oil agreement fact sheet (31 August 2026)
• White House, statement on the 3 January 2026 Venezuela operation
• Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, regional energy licences (14 August 2026)
• International Court of Justice, Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), Case No. 171
• Venezuela Ministry of Planning, acting President Rodríguez on the Guayana Esequiba claim (13 May 2026)
• CARICOM, statement reaffirming Guyana's territorial integrity and the ICJ process (28 April 2026)
• ExxonMobil Guyana, 900,000 b/d milestone and expected 1.7mn boe/d capacity from eight developments
• US Department of Defense, Operation Epic Fury fact sheet (6 April 2026)
• High Commission of India, India–Guyana Bilateral Brief (February 2025)
• SphereX Professional Services Inc., *The Stabroek Block Has Entered a New Financial Phase: A Financial and Fiscal Reading of the 2025 Operator and Co-Venture Accounts* (August 2026).
• Caribbean National Weekly, disputed maritime enforcement incident involving the Opposition Leader (26 August 2026)
• News Room Guyana, completion of evidentiary disclosure in the extradition proceedings (28 November 2025)
• Guyana Chronicle, full disclosure in the Mohamed extradition proceedings and reported investigation timeline (29 November 2025)

End note: authorship and AI disclosure

Author: Joel Bhagwandin. AI-assisted editorial disclosure: The intellectual architecture, core argument, substantive structure, analysis and conclusions in this paper are the original intellectual property of the author. Artificial-intelligence tools were used to assist with research, source discovery and cross-checking, editorial refinement and document formatting. They were not used as a substitute for the author's human intelligence, professional judgment or responsibility for the final work. All substantive judgments and conclusions remain those of the author and were subject to human review.

Institutional note: *This note is intended to advance evidence-based policy discussion and does not represent the Government of Guyana, any political party or any foreign government. Allegations and charges are identified as such. Facts and time-sensitive figures are stated as at 1 September 2026.*

SPHEREX PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC.

ABOUT SPHEREX

Finance-led advisory. Applied intelligence. Disciplined execution.

AI-ENABLED ADVISORY PLATFORM

Human judgement + data systems + capital discipline

A frontier-market advisory platform built for capital, strategy, and execution

SphereX integrates finance, policy intelligence, capital-market discipline, enterprise analytics, and AI-enabled workflows to help institutions convert analysis into decisions, decisions into execution, and execution into measurable impact.

SphereX exists to bridge the gap between technical analysis and bankable, institution-ready execution.

Headquartered in Georgetown, Guyana and founded in 2022, SphereX serves private enterprises, joint ventures, public institutions, development partners, and global investors operating in high-growth frontier markets. Its advisory model is designed for environments where finance, policy, governance, data, and execution capacity must operate as one integrated system.

12	2022	AI + FINANCE
SOLUTION AREAS	FOUNDED	INTEGRATED MODEL

Capability Architecture | Strategy, finance, intelligence, systems, and execution disciplines operating as one advisory stack.

01 **Finance & Capital** FP&A, capital structuring, investment readiness, M&A advisory, valuation, and transaction support.	02 **Markets & Policy** Policy briefs, sector intelligence, political economy, governance analysis, and strategic market positioning.	03 **Systems & AI** Enterprise analytics, process redesign, digital enablement, and AI-supported decision workflows.
04 **Compliance & Risk** Control design, regulatory discipline, reporting systems, institutional resilience, and risk governance.	05 **Execution Support** Operating models, implementation workplans, stakeholder coordination, and performance benchmarking.	06 **Frontier Strategy** Investor positioning, competitiveness, small-state resilience, and strategic growth advisory.

Applied Intelligence Model | Evidence translated into action through disciplined financial logic and implementation architecture.

EVIDENCE	ANALYSIS	EXECUTION	RESILIENCE
Data, market signals, institutional context	Financial logic, policy constraints, strategic options	Workplans, governance, systems, cadence	Controls, learning loops, performance discipline

PUBLICATION AND ADVISORY CONTACT

info@spherexgy.com | +592 652-1995 | www.spherexgy.com

165 Waterloo Street, Regus Building, Georgetown, Guyana

AUTHOR

Joel Bhagwandin

Director | Financial Advisory & Strategy

jbhagwandin@spherexgy.com | LinkedIn

SphereX publications support evidence-led strategy, market intelligence, policy analysis, transaction readiness, and institutional decision-making across Guyana and other frontier-market contexts.